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Timothy SNYDER, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York : Basic
Books, 2010, XIX + 524 p. [version française : Terres de sang. L’Europe entre Hitler et Staline,
Paris : Gallimard, 2012, 712 p.]
1 Bloodlands or a Bloody Nose to History? Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands
2 Long ago, the study of the Soviet and Nazi enterprises turned into a cottage industry,
and numerous monographs,  articles,  memoirs,  diaries  and collections of  documents
continue to emerge. With so much written, separately and in tandem, one wonders if
there is a room for yet another study of the so-called totalitarian twins. Certainly so,
argues Timothy Snyder. Snyder takes to task the entire body of literature that preceded
his own Bloodlands:  Europe between Hitler  and Stalin.  “This is  a moment that we have
scarcely begun to understand, let alone master,” declares Snyder. “Only an unabashed
acceptance  of  the  similarities  between  the  Nazi  and  Soviet  systems  permits  an
understanding of their difference,” Snyder breaks the news to his readers. This is a bold
statement and one that deserves close scrutiny, the more so when it  comes from a
scholar who is a specialist in neither Nazi Germany nor the Soviet Union and whose
book is based almost entirely on other scholars’ findings and arguments. 
3 More than fourteen million people perished at the hands of the Nazis and the Soviets
on the territory that encompasses Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, and the
western frontier of Russia. Between 1933 (the onset of the devastating Soviet famine)
and 1945 (the collapse of  Nazi  Germany) the region literally  became Europe’s  main
cemetery for its inhabitants and outsider who were brought there to die in six waves of
mass state terror. In captivating prose that sets him apart from most historians, Snyder
gives voice to multiple individual victims who died as a direct result of two sadistic
regimes  that  pursued  unrealizable  utopias  and  radicalized  their  murderous  drives
whenever they saw their plans frustrated. “This is where the power and the malice of
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the Nazi and Soviet regimes overlapped and interacted,” states Snyder. This sounds
reasonable enough, not to mention useful—combining several historical and national
episodes in a single volume. Herein, however, also lie the difficulties and fundamental
weaknesses that undermine the premise of the book’s main arguments, which include a
chronic downplaying of the role of local perpetrators and indigenous anti-Semitism in
the region. To this reviewer, the argument of the Nazis and Soviets interacting and
enabling each other, the historicity of the territory of the so-called Bloodlands, and the
chronological framework are nothing but unproven assumptions and the fruits of the
author’s personal agenda rather than historical evidence. 
4 For one, the argument for the two systems and leaders teaching and enabling each
other is not exactly novel and to put it mildly, has not taken root since Ernst Nolte’s
debunked argument of Nazism as a copycat of Bolshevism. Repetitive assumptions do
not constitute evidence no matter how eloquent and playful the language employed.
After several hundred pages the assumption that there was any link between the Soviet
famine of  1932-1933 (which is  presented as a  deliberate ethnic-oriented act  despite
serious arguments to the contrary) and the Nazi genocidal policies remain just that: an
unsubstantiated assumption. It goes without saying that the Soviets and the Nazis were
watching each other closely. In private, Stalin and Hitler expressed admiration for the
ruthlessness of each other, and for a brief moment in 1939-1941 actually collaborated in
the dismemberment of Poland, the Baltic States, and parts of Romania. Regrettably,
Snyder never elaborates on actual interactions between the two. He justly points to the
Nazi attempts to seek Soviet absorption of Jewish refugees in 1940. He could have gone
further—but ultimately does not—and identify certain spheres of mutual learning and
direct impact between the two sides. 
5 First was the policy of population exchange. In 1939-1941, the Soviets were nervously
watching, carefully studying and reluctantly collaborating in the Nazi evacuation of
Volksdeutschen from the territories allotted to the Soviets in the 1939 pact. Three years
later, they proceeded to implement the population exchange with newly established
Poland using the very same infrastructure created and left by the Germans, down to the
Nazi  original  documents  from  1939-1940.  The  same  applies  to  the  postwar  re-
collectivization drive—a major event that is not even mentioned in the book. In the
absence of any meaningful socio-economic stratification in the countryside the Soviet
regime  invented  new  social  category  based  on  individual  wartime  conduct,  mainly
collaboration with the German occupiers and anti-Soviet armed resistance.  Notably,
both episodes relate to the brief prelude of war years, the only period when the two
systems actually interacted. 
6 But was there any policy that either side learned from the other and had not executed
already or was there any policy that enabled the other? Did the Soviets need a Nazi
example of “decapitating Polish society”? Hadn’t they done just that inside the Soviet
Union  for  two  decades  prior  to  the  Second  World  War,  if  only  with  much  more
thoroughness than the Nazis? The history of the Bolshevik Revolution was marked by
the  destruction  of  any autonomous  elite  and  its  replacement  by  another  that  was
deemed bereft of all self-interest. And did the Nazis draw inspiration from the Soviet
calamitous collectivization and famine when they gassed tens of thousands of mentally
disabled on German territory proper before the war, an exterminatory campaign that is
considered as the forerunner of the Holocaust? Did the stubborn Soviet resistance to
the Nazi invasion that frustrated resettlement plans pave the way to the Holocaust, or
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maybe one should be alerted to the lethal combination of racist, genocidal ideology and
ongoing brutalization of conduct? At most, the two regimes responded to perceived
threats by the other, as the Soviets did in deporting over one million ethnic Germans
whom they suspected would shift their loyalty to the invading Germans. It would be a
stretch to define even this operation as interaction and in any case it took place beyond
the territory under discussion.
7 Zila  Rennert  would  have  made  an  honorary  citizen  of  the  Bloodlands,  had  such  a
territory existed. She opens her riveting memoir, Trois wagons à bestiaux (Three Cattle
Wagons)  with  the  German  bombardment  of  her  native  Vilnius,  which  launched  a
crisscross fatal journey between Vienna, Vilnius, Lviv, Krakow and Warsaw. Along the
way she managed to escape Soviet deportation by jumping off a Soviet train, survive
the  German  occupation  and  genocide  under  an  assumed  identity,  cheated  death
numerous time while losing her husband and the father of her only daughter to the
Gestapo,  witness  the  Warsaw  Ghetto burning  with  some  Poles  expressing  their
admiration for the rebels and compassion for their fate only to hear them laughing at
the site of the burning ghetto (“Look at the Yids fry!”) and depart Poland when the
postwar anti-Semitic wave became too much to bear.  Rennert had experienced and
seen it all. Rennert does not appear in Bloodlands’ exhaustive bibliography. Nor could
she be there without compromising its basic assumptions. Her first memory refers to
the German bombing of Vilnius in 1914, just as the subtitle of her memoirs (D’une guerre
à l’autre à travers l’Europe Centrale, 1914-1946) points to a more appropriate periodization
of  the  era  of  mass  state  violence  in  Europe,  which  was  earlier  and  significantly
moremultifaceted. 
8 The same applies to the classic memoir of Lev Kopelev, The Education of a True Believer.
This uniquely candid reflection of the self-styled communist zealot-turned-dissident
has long served as the introduction of students of the Soviet epoch to the world of the
perpetrators-collectivizers in Soviet Ukraine. Kopelev, too, is absent from Bloodlands’
bibliography. It may well be that the author, not a specialist in Soviet history, is simply
unaware of the famous memoir. But even if he were, it would be an improbable source
to  use  given  that  many of  Kopelev’s  protagonists  acquired  their  credentials  in  the
horrifically brutal requisitions of the Civil War, some twelve years earlier. And this goes
to a core problem of this book: the arbitrary choice of time and geographical frames
that do not make sense either historically or geopolitically. Ideologically based mass
violence in East-Central Europe did not erupt in 1932-1933 nor was it limited to the so-
called Bloodlands. By conservative estimates, the Russian Civil War claimed the lives of
some 8 million people—far more than any event described by Snyder.  Moreover,  it
came in the wake of the First World War, a cataclysm that saw the death, deportation
and starvation of millions in this vast territory, often based on similar rationale that
Snyder confines to the 1930s-1940s. 
9 And so it is with geography, too. For one, the Nazi genocidal campaign against the Jews
did not know geographical  boundaries.  The fight against the “eternal Jew” was not
limited to a certain territory or an ad-hoc campaign. Simply put, the Nazis slated the
Jews of western and southern Europe to the same fate as their East European brethren
and that the bulk of the genocide took place in the Bloodlands is  neither here nor
there. Second, along the way, the reader finds that when convenient, Kazakhstan—the
Central  Asian  Soviet  Republic  that  suffered  the  harshest  consequences  of  Soviet
collectivization but left unmolested by the Nazis—is integrated into the discussion of
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the European Bloodlands, but neighboring Romania, armed with fascist state ideology
and genocidal policies it developed before the war and which accounted for the death
of some 380,000 Jews, is not. Its role is limited to a cameo appearance (p. 218-219) that
emphasizes the distinction between the Nazi principled and the Romanian pragmatic
genocidal polities. In the same vein, the Baltics, and Lithuania in particular, with their
indigenous murderous movements that struck their Jewish minority even prior to the
Nazi  arrival  and  after  that  often  independently,  are  allotted  four  rushed  pages  of
superficial survey that again assign the recent Soviet occupation with responsibility for
the  lethal  indigenous  anti-Semitism that  swept  the  region  (p. 192-96).  Bloodlands,  it
seems, is an elastic category that corresponds to the author’s agenda and knowledge
rather than to any historical reality. The arbitrary and ahistorical delineation of the
site of mass atrocities allows Snyder to focus on regimes and personalities (Nazi and
Soviet, Hitler and Stalin) and conveniently turn a blind eye to the fact that they worked
to such extreme levels because they were embraced by large sectors of the societies
that populated the region and were brewing with resentments and violence well before
the chronological markers of the present study. Which turns our attention to the most
glaring  MIA  of  Bloodlands:  the  role  of  local  perpetrators  and  collaborators  in  the
genocide of European Jewry. 
10 No  credible  historian  would  counter  the  argument  that  the  Holocaust  was  a  Nazi-
orchestrated enterprise, just as no credible historian would contend that without mass
collaboration and active participation of local perpetrators, the Holocaust would not
have reached the magnitude it did. The Nazis and the Soviets did not arrive at, nor did
they  operate  on  virgin  lands  and  tabula  rasa  populations.  Nor  were  they  the  only
powers aspiring and practicing revolutionary, violent transformation of the region. By
the time the totalitarian regimes arrived, these territories were already crowded with a
variety  of  political  forces  driven  by  different  ideologies  and  goals  but  sharing  a
common  illiberal  ethos  and  practices  in  their  quest  for  consolidated  territory  and
homogenized populace. The gap between the political and ethnic maps of post-World
War I  East-Central  Europe  was  supposed  to  be  bridged  by  good  governance  of
minorities. Yet right from the start, the concessions to minorities were perceived as the
humiliating  price  tag  exacted  by  outside  powers  in  exchange  for  their  support  of
independence  of  the  new  states  and  intrusion  in  the  nationalizing  political  and
economic agenda. The rise of the radical revolutionary right saddled these polities with
a  dual  polarization:  the  widening  gap  between  the  relatively  liberal constitutional
obligations and the intense nationalizing propaganda, and the growing rift between
conservative nationalistic regimes and radical nationalistic movements. These tensions
led to the simultaneous attrition of minority rights and the suppression of the radical
right by the conservative regimes. The strict enforcement of order in the streets held
political  violence  in  check,  but  with  a price  tag  of  further  weakening  whatever
institutional integrity that survived the authoritarian turn in the mid-1930s. On the eve
of World War II the territory of Bloodlands was dense with governments seeking ways
to  get  rid  of  their  minorities,  racist  movements  and  violent  public  and  private
discourse. 
11 And yet, a book that centers on mass murder in the region between 1932 and 1945,
hardly dwells on these developments, and worse, ignores their wartime consequences.
With the  exception of  a  few cursory  pages  on local  collaboration that  refer  to  the
phenomenon as basically a by-product of the Nazi and Soviet violence—one will look in
vain  for  a  discussion of  the  local  perpetrators.  Locals,  in  Snyder’s  Bloodlands,  had
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neither agency nor ideology. They were all members of an unfortunate human cohort
that struggled to survive, whether they were Jews, Ukrainians, Balts or Poles. Whether
numerous  active  perpetrators  who  launched  lethal  pogroms  against  the  Jewish
communities in the Baltics, Ukraine, Belorussia before the Nazi arrival, the hundreds of
thousands enlisted in the German auxiliary police and participated in rounding up,
beating,  humiliating  and killing  Jews,  and  the  prevalent  hostility  toward  Jews  that
isolated them and often left them on their own, Snyder’s locals, had no agency in the
mass violence that engulfed these territories.
12 Bloodlands,  however,  does  not  stop  there.  When  Snyder  focuses  on  Poles,  the
constituency he cares most about and the one he actually knows, the sins of omission
turn crude. If one wishes to celebrate Polish noble conduct during the dark days of the
war,  suffice  to  consult  the  list  of  Righteous  among  the  Nations  in  Yad  Vashem
Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem. Poles make the largest group, and by far: 6, 394 out of
24,811 recognized by early 2013. But what purpose is served by omitting any reference
to Polish responsibility and their role in wartime atrocities? Snyder’s Ukrainians bear
the brunt of responsibility for the wartime interethnic violence in the region, the best-
known episode being the cleansing of Poles from Volhynia in summer 1943. How about
a word on the interwar Polish state that did its best to suffocate its minorities, whether
it was the planned Polonization of Ukrainians and Belarusians, the economicide of the
Jews and their constant harassment and humiliation across the mythical divides of 1926
and 1935 hoping they would all lead to out migration. Two decades of bigoted policies
provided a fertile ground for the future perpetrators. After celebrating the so-called
“Volhynian experiment” in his previous publications as one of eastern Europe’s most
ambitious policies of toleration” with hardly a word about the intended schemes for
the Jews,  we now learn in a passing remark that the interwar government actually
sought  their  departure.  Even  this  concession  is  paired  with  saluting  the  policy  of
military training of right-wing Zionist organizations. 
13 Further, the reader learns that for every local display of indifference and cruelty there
was a mitigating, balancing act. The Home Army, we are told, indeed had a minority of
anti-Semites in its ranks but it did combat them. The most we can account for is a
single  case of  killing Jews.  Maybe,  but  only at  the cost  of  ignoring the well-known
studies  of  other  historians  who  meticulously  recorded  numerous  hostilities  of  all
factions of the Home Army and the regional factor where most help offered by Poles to
Jews was in prewar southeastern District of Galicia, in sharp contrast to the central
regions.1 The Home Army provided the Ghetto uprising with some weapons from its
modest arsenal, we learn. How modest it was even the sources cited do not convey.
When Poles made cutthroat gestures to Jews on the trains to death camps, they did not
rejoice the calamity: all they meant was “to communicate to the Jews that they were
going to die—though not necessarily that the Poles wished this upon them” (p. 266). A
novel interpretation, indeed. And then comes the rewriting of Czesław Myłosz. In his
heart-wrenching and guilt-stricken poem, “A Poor Christian Looks at the Ghetto,” the
great humanist poet talks about the “guardian mole who distinguishes human ashes by
their luminous vapor; the ashes of each man by a different part of the spectrum.” And
in Snyder’s summation: “No earthly agent could sort the Jewish ashes from the Polish
ones.” (p. 297) Well, the earthly Nazis, the Poles and the Jews did. To the long list of
victims paraded in the book, one could add Miłosz’s spirit and intent. Finally, we learn
in a passing comment that after the war, Poles beat, killed and threatened Jews who
tried to return home (p. 352), an impressively laconic phrase to describe the murder of
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more  than  1,000  Jews  between 1944-1947,  of  whom  351  were  murdered  between
November 1944 and December 1945 alone. And this is in a book that is obsessed with
statistics and gory details of atrocities.2 Needless to say, there is hardly a word on the
wave of the postwar pogroms, including the most notorious in Kielce. Apparently, some
numbers and events are less important than others, especially when thy do not fit the
overarching argument and narrative.  There is  a  lot  to  celebrate  and admire in the
often-tragic history of Poland. The soul-searching that the nation has gone through
following  the  publications  of  Jan  Gross  on  local  perpetrators  during  and  after  the
Holocaust stands in stark contrast to most eastern European countries that still avoid
the issue. Creating and celebrating a false equilibrium is the last thing that Poles or any
other European society emerging from the disastrous communist experience needs.
14 The bulk of Bloodlands draws on well-known and rich works that define the study of
totalitarianism,  but  at  no  point  does Snyder  bother  to  engage  the  concepts  and
argument  of  the many  scholars  he  relies  on.  With  one  awkward  exception  of  an
incomprehensible  footnote  (485-486,  n. 21)  that  criticizes  the  studies  of  Jan Gross—
without  actually  addressing  Gross’  seminal  studies  of  Polish  perpetrators—the  only
other scholar that figures in Snyder’s treatise is Hannah Arendt. Pairing oneself with
and against Arendt is a tall order for anyone. Suffice to say that Snyder would have
done himself a service had he followed Arendt’s full investigation of the perpetrators in
her  seminal  Origins  of  Totalitarianism.  Emphasizing  that  most  of  the  killing  in  the
Holocaust was carried out not in the death camps but rather by shooting in the open is
an interesting observation. However, the death camps for Arendt mattered not because
of the numbers killed or the methods employed there, rather as the only site where
totalitarian movements could reach the ultimate goal of total control. More important,
Arendt did not limit herself to the question of what happened—the stated and timid
goal of Bloodlands—but boldly, even if controversially, pursued the questions of how and
why European civilization reached Auschwitz. 
15 When  all  is  said  and  done,  one  is  left  with  the  troubling  sense  that  despite  the
outlandish promises of Bloodlands, the conventional wisdom that the Nazis stood in a
league of their own and operated in a different realm remains intact. Not only were the
Nazis responsible for the absolute majority of the victims in Bloodlands,  ten out of
fourteen million according to Snyder’s calculation, as Snyder himself concedes but fails
to elaborate on the reasons for this difference. At stake is not only statistics. Who was
the Soviet equivalent to Heinrich Himmler, the architect of the Holocaust who presided
over  the  murder  of  millions  and  traveled  to  Finland  in  July  1942  to  persuade  its
government to deliver a  handful  of  foreign Jews who managed to escape his  death
machine? Who were Nazi counterparts to the kulaks, a cohort that was divided into
three categories with corresponding punishments, many of whom were reintegrated
into society following their participation in World War II? Does the Jewish-kulak bind
lead us anywhere? If one insists on the comparison, then probably a more appropriate
comparison  would  be  to  the  bandenkampf,  the  persecution  of  “asocials”  and  a
comparison to concentration, not death, camps. This, however, would have required
the actual mastering of both Soviet and Nazi history. Falling back on Vasilii Grossman’s
oft-quoted insights into the similarities between the Soviets and the Nazis does not
absolve  the  historian  from  probing  the  fundamental  differences  between  the  two
regimes, especially those that accounted for the one being nihilistic and genocidal, and
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the other not. Long on promises and short on delivery, replete with equations that are
often baseless and at times tasteless, Bloodlands ends up as a bloody nose to history. 
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